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THE JOURNEY OF FDR’S PUBLIC IMAGE 
AS THE DEMOCRATIC DICTATOR 
n
B Y  A N D R E W  W.  OT TO N
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) public image rose in his firstterm, fell in his second, and rebounded in his third. The essen-
tial focus of this paper is to examine how FDR portrayed himself to
the public, as well as explain the tumultuous nature of his image
over his three terms. This is significant, as other scholarship has
overlooked this important part, leaving the understanding of FDR
lacking. Other scholarship focuses mostly on policy and politics
when concerned with FDR’s speeches, specifically the fireside chats,
and the potential societal, economic, cultural, etc. impact the speech
might have had. Davis Houck is a good exception to that. He has a
discussion of FDR trying to insert the traits of a dictator into his pub-
lic image, which one will discuss later.1 Even when looking at
rhetoricians, many spend their time discussing the particular way
FDR used language to be effectively persuasive. However, there is an
exception to that in Mary Stuckey, who discusses how FDR com-
bined his image and that of the government’s.2 Those two exceptions,
which do discuss the way FDR portrayed himself, still only offer
small pieces of information particular to one part of FDR’s wide ora-
tory. Houck focuses on FDR’s first inaugural, and Stuckey’s argues
the definition of the “modern presidency,” focusing on the persua-
sive language of FDR, the discussion of merged identities only being
small and tangential.3 What is lacking is a discussion of FDR’s per-
sonal motivations behind his speeches, something that could benefit
all other academic work surrounding FDR. Others discuss political
motivations through policy FDR wanted passed, but there is little dis-
cussion of how FDR used himself as a tool to convince the public.
This paper will attempt to address that. 
FDR’s public image changed significantly across his first three terms,
the early impetus for those changes beginning in his interregnum.
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This paper will focus solely on speeches given by FDR himself,
namely his first three inaugural addresses and a selection of his fire-
side chats. In his first term, FDR attempted to establish a balanced
image as the “democratic dictator” and that of the “people’s presi-
dent.” In the second term FDR overestimated the political capital he
created in his first term while establishing that image, leading him to
tip the balance in favor of the democratic dictator half, which led to
two significant political failures. Finally, in his third term FDR rebal-
anced his image between the democratic dictator and the “people’s
president,” due in part to the failures in his second term and to the
emergence of World War II.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had little more than four months be-
tween the day of his election and the day of his inauguration to for-
mulate an approach to the public. He had many things to consider in
his approach, the obvious, and greatest, issue being the Great
 Depression. The infamous stock market crash of October 29, 1929,
referred to as “Black Tuesday,” happened three years before FDR’s
election, meaning the Great Depression had a great impact already:
an estimated one-third of all workers lost their jobs, gross income
from farming and agriculture halved, and banks foreclosed one thou-
sand houses daily.4 All of those situations, which had developed in
those short three years, posed problems that FDR would have to deal
with directly.
In that four-month period, FDR accomplished very little in terms
of fixing those problems, due in large part to the politics between
himself and Herbert Hoover. FDR and his staff instead began plan-
ning for the unknown, as Adolf Berle, an aid to FDR, noted two days
after the election in November 1932, “It must be remembered by
March 4 next we may have anything on our hands from a recovery to
a revolution.”5 FDR might not have known exactly what to do, but he
had already decided the problem with the economy came from a do-
mestic source, where Hoover argued an international one, essentially
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the opposite of FDR.6 Raymond Moley, an early speechwriter and
 adviser to FDR, noted that FDR might have cooperated with Hoover
during those four months if not for the fact that the issue was the
economy. FDR disagreed so deeply that he refused to pollute his
point of view by cooperating.7 Unfortunately, the key issue sur-
rounding the two administrations was not something like foreign
policy, upon which FDR agreed with Hoover.8
Luckily, FDR agreed with Hoover on foreign policy, as much of
the world changed in those four months, specifically the rise of fas-
cism, which would have effects far into FDR’s presidency. Germany
selected Adolf Hitler as their new Chancellor, and Japan announced
that it would be leaving the League of Nations to continue its action
towards capturing Manchuria.9 Interestingly, FDR had his inaugura-
tion March 4, 1933, and Hitler March 5, both dying within weeks of
each other as well.10 Over the next twelve years, each man ran their
respective countries, while despising one another and all they stood
for.11 This is important to note, as the further into FDR’s presidency,
the more the issue of Hitler arose. Hitler, and others like him such as
Benito Mussolini, became for FDR one of the biggest threats to the
United States as it directly challenged democracy, which FDR be-
lieved to be the foundation of the United States. 
The roots of FDR’s approach to his image began when he served
as New York’s governor from 1929 to 1932 in the form of “fireside
chats.” He came into office as governor in January of 1929, and in
April he gave his first ever “fireside chat,” where he then continued
to give them periodically throughout his governorship and into his
presidency.12 A “fireside chat,” was essentially a radio address FDR
prepared in advance that focused on one topic. FDR used the chats
as a way to inform the people about the situation related to that
topic, and then to use as a platform to attempt to convince the public
of the correct solution: his. That same basic formula continued
throughout his presidency. Samuel Rosenman, an adviser and
44
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speechwriter for FDR, who served with him from his governorship
throughout his presidency, suggested that the fireside chats had a
significant impact on FDR’s success as governor. They appealed di-
rectly to the people, bypassing debates with other politicians or dis-
cussions with the media entirely.13 It made certain the fact that FDR
fully controlled his message, and nobody could interpret what he
said, changing his intended meaning.
By addressing the people directly himself, FDR could ensure that
no journalist would misinterpret and inaccurately inform the public
of his message — the way he portrayed himself to the people —
 allowing him to receive direct feedback from the people in the form
of letters. Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine provide a collection
of letters handpicked from, by their estimation, some fifteen to thir-
ty million letters people sent to FDR over the course of his presiden-
cy.14 It is important to note that the Levines picked the pools of
letters this paper uses, limiting the selection to only a couple of
dozen at most per fireside chat.15 Those letters played an extremely
important role throughout FDR’s presidency, as FDR believed them
a key aspect of serving as president. He firmly believed that because
he paid so much attention to those letters, by receiving daily mail
briefs and reading letters himself, he had the best knowledge of what
the public actually thought.16 The letters had a more direct affect as
well, as Samuel Rosenman noted instances where FDR reversed a
policy decision, or acted on a policy much sooner, due to the reac-
tion he received from letters.17 Leila A. Sussmann, a rhetorician,
even goes as far to suggest that the letters had an essential role in
FDR’s decision to run for a fourth term.18
FDR’s relationship with the media directly affected the way he ap-
proached the public. He had a poor relationship with the media, so
he used the fireside chats to avoid the media entirely, appealing
 directly to the people. Other than the fireside chats and the letters
FDR received, he interacted with the public mainly through the
45
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White House correspondents. Betty Winfield discusses FDR’s rela-
tionship with the correspondents essentially as FDR’s attempt to
control them. Winfield argues that FDR “wanted the White House
correspondents to act as conveyor belts, stenographers, and accurate
reporters of spot news from his perspective.”19 He effectively wanted
them to be nothing more than outlets to regurgitate his message,
nothing more, meaning no independent interpretation of what he
said that would then lead to misinformation. Winfield notes several
instances of FDR both directing his control and voicing it: he would
openly criticize the media for its common practice of reinterpreta-
tion, plant people to ask questions at press conferences, and he en-
acted the direct-quotation rule, which stated that the press could
only quote FDR if the White House gave them the quote in writing.20
FDR avoided those problems with his fireside chats, as Winfield
notes, “with radio, FDR could be the news-gatherer, the reporter, as
well as the editor.”21 In other words, FDR had control of the informa-
tion, nobody else. With his chats, FDR did not risk someone else ei-
ther challenging or misinterpreting his message. Because of that,
FDR made the media’s only relevance the mediums they provided. 
It is important to note that when one refers to “FDR” one does not
simply refer to the man, but FDR himself and his advisers, all of
which played a significant role in crafting FDR’s speeches. There-
fore, when one does refer to “FDR,” one should read it as “FDR and
associates.” The now infamous “Brain Trust” made up the key associ-
ates through which FDR worked. FDR used them to take an initial
idea of his and refine it into a more structured and sound position.22
This is important to note, as much of the core discussion found in
FDR’s speeches began within the “Brain Trust.” Therefore, any
speech FDR gave came from not just merely an effort on his part,
but borne out of a collective discussion including FDR and the “Brain
Trust.” 
Just four months following his election victory in November of
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1932, FDR gave his first speech to the public as president in his first
inaugural address. From the outset, he gave the inaugural the pur-
pose of outlining his agenda for the next four years, as well as outlin-
ing what his role would be. This is a common trait shared among his
inaugurals, as one would guess would be similar to other presidents
as well. On March 4, 1933, Hoover handed the reins of the presidency
over to FDR. Immediately, FDR attempted to dispel two falsities in
his first inaugural, both of which stem from his dreadful experience
with Hoover throughout the 1932 election. Hoover’s campaign con-
stantly accused FDR of being a weak man, both physically, alluding
to his disability, and politically, claiming he lacked experience.23
Hoover’s administration believed FDR so weak that Hoover and his
aides spoke openly about wanting FDR as their opponent in the 1932
election because they believed FDR would be an easily defeated op-
ponent.24 Second, and equally as important, FDR also had to address
the characteristics ascribed to the presidency during Hoover’s “lame
duck” period. Many, including Hoover’s Secretary of State, described
Hoover as pessimistic and out of touch, and because of Hoover’s un-
popularity, he needed a heavier than normal police escort in some
cases.25 FDR’s reaction to Hoover established the balanced image and
traits of both the “democratic dictator” and the seemingly incongru-
ous “people’s president.” 
Historians agree that FDR attempted to distance himself from
Hoover in his first inaugural address as an active, optimistic, and au-
thoritative president. Disagreements arise when discussing how
much power FDR assumed for himself. Most, such as James Mac-
Gregor Burns and biographer Jean Edward Smith, discuss FDR’s con-
flict between balancing his executive powers and that of the
legislature — FDR creating power through influence over Congress.26
One historian, Davis Houck, entertains the idea that FDR tried to
balance the image of a dictator within a democracy, while discussing
the relationship between the executive and the legislature.27 Houck
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includes notes from Raymond Moley, which state the early eight
points FDR wanted to discuss in his first inaugural. Number six was
“Dictatorship,” and number seven was “No failure of Democracy.”28 It
appears then that FDR struggled to combine the seemingly incon-
gruous concepts of a dictator within a democracy. Specifically, he
wanted the attributes and traits of a dictator applied to him, but with-
in the realm of democracy, a “democratic dictator” in a sense —
those traits being control, unquestionable leadership, and the fact
that he as democratic dictator would be the one to lead the vision of
the nation. Those qualities had an obvious contrast to the qualities
attached to Hoover, which FDR wanted as he did not want one ounce
of Hoover’s pessimism to carry over into his presidency.
FDR crafted his image of the democratic dictator through his judg-
ment on the balance of power between the three branches, specifi-
cally the legislative and executive. FDR spent most of the inaugural
discussing what he planned to do as president to fix the crisis the
U.S. found itself in at the time, but he did not discuss how he would
do it until the end. The first step FDR took in instilling the traits of
the democratic dictator in himself began cautiously:
It is hoped that the normal balance of executive and leg-
islative authority may be wholly adequate to meet the un-
precedented task before us. But it may be that an
unprecedented demand and need for delayed action may
call for temporary departure from that normal balance of
public procedure.29
With the nation as a whole at stake, FDR argued for a necessary, but
temporary, suspension of the nation’s delicate balance of power. One
will see that essential tactic repeated in later chats as well. In many
occasions, as one will see, FDR justified his actions as the democratic
dictator by arguing for the sake of the nation, but he would always do
so within the bounds of democracy. The “temporary” suspension
served as a small means to a greater end, meaning the restoration of
democracy to its previous state before the crisis. In other words, FDR
48
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wanted to act outside the normal bounds of democracy so that he
could then fix it.
FDR also acknowledged that if he saw democracy failing to ac-
complish what he believed necessary, he would attempt to correct it
himself: 
But in the event that the Congress shall fail… and in the
event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall
not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront
me. I shall ask the Congress for… broad Executive power
to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the
power that would be given to me if we were in fact invad-
ed by a foreign foe.30
In other words, FDR wanted to assume a role like that of a dictator, as
long as the democracy allowed it. This is where the “people’s presi-
dent” comes into play. The traits attached to the “people’s president”
in its purest form — if FDR only stood on that side of the balance —
would mean that FDR had one lone duty to do what the nation
willed, and that all his actions had to be for the people’s right to steer
him in a certain direction. In other words, FDR had no hidden agen-
da. Even though FDR used clear language that he wanted to increase
the power of the executive branch, he did so within the bounds of
democracy. That is the essential interplay between the democratic
dictator and the “people’s president.” FDR would act as the democrat-
ic dictator to suggest a means to an end, but would then say the peo-
ple, or some other function of democracy like Congress, had the
responsibility to accept or reject his suggestion to move forward. The
small price people had to pay for the disruption in the balance of
power held little importance to FDR if it meant fixing the crisis of the
Great Depression. 
FDR began his first term in his inaugural with the strong language
associated with the democratic dictator, but soon turned to a more
balanced approach by suggesting that he was no more than just an
American like the rest of the public. Less than two weeks after his in-
augural, FDR gave his first fireside chat as president on March 12.31
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This chat on banking had more technical discussions than most, the
intricacies of banking, but as the first fireside chat, it introduced im-
portant and common themes one will see in later chats. Buhite and
Levy noticed the first theme, where FDR attempted to foster an idea
of “us vs. them.”32 FDR united the people generally, while at the
same time blaming a small minority, a minority that he would craft
in a way for all people to universally oppose. That effort served two
purposes, to unite the people and include FDR himself in the “us” as
well. The nation needed a concerted effort by all, including FDR, to
defeat the troublesome minority, in this case “incompetent” and/or
“dishonest” bankers.33 FDR used personal language throughout to
gain that effect, for example referring to the people as “my friends.”
The final line of the chat, “Together we cannot fail,” likely best repre-
sents the sentiment.34 As long as the United States stood together,
meaning FDR and the people, they would be successful. The impli-
cation of that being failure would be the outcome if either side did
not do their part, which meant that the people had to approve FDR’s
decisions.
Rhetorician Mary Stuckey helps further the image that FDR
served the people as an equal to them, yet still with a different role.
She discusses the idea that FDR used language to make the nation
appear as a family, with FDR the fatherly figure.35 The nation and
each individual shared the same goal, but how each individual at-
tained that goal differed. In FDR’s case, that meant being the leader.
In other words, FDR led the way while the people made sure he did
not go outside the bounds of democracy. In addition to that, Stuckey
argues that FDR’s use of language to merge his and the government’s
identity making it indistinguishable from one another played a sig-
nificant role in his success.36 If the public approved of the govern-
ment, they approved of FDR and vice versa. In other words, the
public would attribute success anywhere in government to FDR due
to the merged identities. 
50
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One can best see the assertion Stuckey makes, as well as the ideas
of FDR’s image from his first inaugural, when FDR discussed the sec-
ond step of his plan to fix the banking crisis, “the legislation promptly
and patriotically passed by the Congress confirming my proclama-
tion and broadening my powers…”37 It is not important to our ques-
tion what FDR planned to do, but how he planned to do it. This
quote offers some insight into the careful messages FDR crafted.
First, the democratic dictator is present. FDR specifically said that
Congress confirmed “my proclamation.” He, nobody else, led it, but
at the same time, he worked within the bounds of democracy by
going through Congress. Including “my proclamation,” is “my powers.”
He did not say the government’s powers, the executive’s powers, or
the federal bureaucracies, but FDR himself. He left no question to
who led the country, when he discussed the government’s interests,
lending to that idea Stuckey expressed about FDR merging his identity
with that of the government. His actions and those of the govern-
ments came from the same source, FDR himself. This made the
 issues personal, helping the people look to FDR instead of some un-
known bureaucracy whose name came in the form of an acronym.
Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine offer insight into the per-
sonal level FDR brought to his speeches in their analysis of letters
sent to him at the White House. The some forty million people,
which the Levines consider a conservative estimate, listened to that
first chat and based on their analysis, the people heard, understood,
and accepted FDR at his word.38 In addition to their own analysis,
they provide many letters that share that same sentiment of trust in
FDR. Of the 37 letters the Levines’ provided, the majority discuss
their surprise at the intimate nature of the speech. One letter sums
up the shared sentiment eloquently, that FDR “honored every home
with a personal visit last night.”39 The people received much of what
FDR had hoped, the intimate setting and trust in his new image,
which would not have happened if they still saw him as the weak
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man Hoover tried to impart on them in the 1932 election. The lan-
guage of acceptance in the letters means that the people also accept-
ed the “democratic dictator” as well, whether they knew it or not.
In another fireside chat given only a few months later in May of
1933, FDR evaluated the progress of his New Deal policies, which
gave him the opportunity to further his success, and thereby the
strength of his image, by essentially patting himself on the back.
This speech and the following one discussed are unique in that they
almost discuss FDR himself, or the government, exclusively, instead
of a particular issue. With that in mind, this speech of self-evaluation
became one where FDR justified his previous actions and policies.
Now FDR had the opportunity to show success, where before he only
discussed the potential for success. In the chat, FDR addressed the
fear that his actions as president had put the balance of power be-
tween the three branches in danger, “The only thing that has been
happening has been to designate the president of the United States
as the agency to carry out certain of the purposes of the Congress.”40
Though it appeared that FDR gave a lot of credit to Congress and the
democratic process, he still focused specifically on himself as the
agent through which the government worked. Also, before FDR said
this, he gave himself the credit for first giving the idea to Congress
about appointing him as their agent. When discussing his plans and
his worry that they may be too straining on democracy FDR said,
“The Congress… fully understood this and gave me generous and in-
telligent support.”41 By that, FDR meant the Congress recognized the
need to give him more power and did it. In that light, it would appear
again that it all came back to him. FDR created a complex web of his
strong leadership and dictatorial qualities within the bounds of
democracy. He effectively hid the stronger traits of the democratic
dictator under the process of democracy and Congress. FDR did not
want to be a dictator, but he wanted to be associated as one, which he
did subtly and as letters will point out later, he did well.
52
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The democratic dictator had a strong presence in this chat, but
FDR also adhered greatly to the idea of the “people’s president” as
well, keeping the balance intact. He did this by reinforcing the idea
that he and the people share a symbiotic and interdependent rela-
tionship with one another. He already emphasized and incorporated
himself as just another American in his “us vs. them” language, but
here he expanded upon it to emphasize the idea of separate but
equal. They shared a common goal, but the two parties had different
responsibilities, meaning the people allowed and restricted FDR’s ac-
tions, and FDR acted as their agent within those bounds. He accom-
plished this by more than just thanking the public, but laying the
reason for his successes at their feet, “To you, the people of this
country, all of us in Washington… owe a profound debt of gratitude…
Every ounce of strength, every resource at our command, we have
devoted and we are devoting to the end of justifying your confidence.”42
FDR managed to meld the dictatorial qualities on one hand, and the
democratic qualities of the “people’s president” on the other. He did
this by reinforcing the idea of the “people’s president.” First, he gave
the people a large part of the credit for his success as president so far.
In a sense, FDR made them as important as himself. Second, he
specifically said that every action he considered, as the representa-
tive of the whole government, attempted to justify “your confidence”
— the people’s part in trusting him. FDR implied that without the
people’s confidence in himself as president, the successes achieved
so far would not have happened. In that same vein, FDR implied that
he worked directly for the people, working toward their success.
When looking at letters sent to FDR after this fireside chat, the
people accepted the idea of FDR as both a strong leader, a tool of the
people, and felt that FDR had “justified their confidence.” Using the
letters the Levines provide, it appears that nearly all completely took
to the idea of FDR as a strong leader that they trusted one hundred
percent. Though some disagree, the vast majority carried this senti-
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ment.43 One in particular bought into it so wonderfully FDR could
not have dreamt up a better letter to send himself, “The dictatorship
myth, woven so industriously about your excellency, was knocked
over the fence on Sunday night.”44 The letter also discussed how FDR
accomplished that in his chat by creating a partnership with the peo-
ple and Congress, something the letter claimed to be incompatible
with dictatorship. This suggests that at least one individual saw the
dictatorial qualities, but under the weavings of democracy, where
FDR turned them into the “people’s president.” This is an interesting
letter for another reason as well, as it began to discuss criticisms of
FDR that he addressed a year later in another fireside chat.
That fireside chat offered another opportunity for FDR to discuss
and justify himself, only this time within the context that he defend-
ed himself against criticism. The chat marked the increase in push
back against FDR’s New Deal policies, which he gave in June of
1934, barely over a year after his inauguration. The timing of the
chat was no coincidence, as that year congressional elections oc-
curred.45 The outcomes of those elections held incredible importance
to FDR as they provided verifiable and undeniable evidence of the
people’s support of his policies, as well as himself. The seats won or
lost told him of their support, as he said later in another speech that
he saw himself as the “head of the Democratic Party,” meaning he
led the direction of their policies.46 The outcomes of those elections
help explain FDR’s motivation as to why he chose to address his criti-
cisms at that moment in time.
FDR defended himself and his policies by turning questions of
criticism to the people, rather than himself, reinforcing the image of
the “people’s president.” FDR spent much of the speech directly ad-
dressing some concerns about agriculture, infrastructure, and re-
form. Then he discussed whether the nation considered the progress
so far as an improvement. Obviously, he could not quantifiably an-
swer that, so he asked a few questions of the public, “Are you better
54
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off than you were last year?... Is your faith in your own individual future
more firmly grounded?... Have you as an individual paid too high a
price for these gains?”47 In other words, have FDR’s policies worked
to put the people in a better place, have they worked well enough for
FDR to have their continued confidence, and did they personally
sacrifice anything to have these gains? His approach here differed
from his previous speeches, where he justified his actions through
the successes of his policies on a national level. In this chat he
placed his trust in the people as the “people’s president” individually. 
The chat included the three primary tactics FDR used throughout
his first term, the “people’s president,” the narrative of “us vs. them,”
and the democratic dictator. First, FDR utilized the idea of the “peo-
ple’s president” to again put himself on an equal level as the people.
The questions themselves provide evidence of that. He could have
turned to statistics to show how things had improved, which he had
done in the previous chat, but instead turned to the individual to
keep the idea of the “people’s president” alive. Second, “us vs. them,”
which worked in tandem with the “people’s president” for the pur-
pose of incorporating himself within the public, so as not to be some
separate unidentifiable entity. In this case, the “them” FDR targeted
came in the form of what he called “doubting Thomases,” who ques-
tioned him for their own personal interests, and not for the health of
the nation, which FDR concerned himself with.48 Finally, nearly the
entire chat discussed whether FDR had overstepped his bounds to
become a true dictator. FDR had every confidence that the people
would resoundingly answer “no” he was not a dictator, when he
asked them those questions.49 Placing his confidence in the people
helped both the democratic dictator and the “people’s president.” If
they accepted his trust and answered the questions positively, they
saw his actions as democratic dictator justifiable. The very nature of
asking the questions took attention away from FDR and aided the
idea of the “people’s president.”
55
N O RT H W E S T  PA S S AG E S
14
Northwest Passages, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
http://pilotscholars.up.edu/nwpassages/vol1/iss1/4
The questions posed to the people bypassed the critics to be sure,
but he concerned himself only with the public’s acceptance of his
image. Looking at the letters provided by the Levines, the people
gave mixed reviews of the chat. In previous chats, one could see a
swelling majority supporting FDR, but, it may be of worth to note
that in other chats, the discussed successes related to an entire na-
tion, where here FDR asked each individual. Not many gave agree-
able answers one way or another, other than some definitively
saying “yes,” and some saying “no.”50 FDR targeted his questions in a
way that would produce the individual results; the country had too
many diverse people. However, the 1934 elections offered the true
test of the public’s agreeableness. The normal trend for midterm
elections is for the president’s party to lose some seats in Congress.
FDR came off a massively successful 1932 election, which gave the
Democratic Party massive majorities in both the House and Senate.51
In the 1934 election, the Democratic Party did not lose seats, but
gained even more to give them a three to one majority in the House,
and over two-thirds in the Senate.52 FDR got his answer loud and
clear, what he had done worked, so far at least.
The 1936 election served as further confirmation of FDR’s efforts
in his first term, as the number of democrats in both the House and
Senate increased even more.53 The people seemed not only to have
accepted his meticulously crafted image as a democratic dictator and
“people’s president,” but embraced it. In the sense that FDR reacted
to Hoover and Hoover’s image in FDR’s first term, now in his sec-
ond, FDR reacted to his own image in his second term and second
inaugural. In other words, now FDR reacted to what he had estab-
lished as his image so far. The election of 1936 relieved FDR of any
effect that may have lingered from Hoover, meaning FDR no longer
worked from a negative image but his own self-created positive. One
can define FDR’s second term as his attempt to capitalize on that
positive image he had spent the past four years creating. One may
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see that as similar to his first term, as FDR reacted again to a previ-
ously created image attached to the presidency. In his first term,
FDR had to craft his image under the assumption that he had to con-
vince the public on not only an issue, but on his own ability, as in his
first term the accusations from Hoover’s campaign still had rele-
vance. In his second term, FDR had an established and successful
image, so now he had only to convince the public on an issue. FDR
knew the people accepted his image at this point, so now in his sec-
ond term he tested the limits of that acceptance. In other words,
what could FDR get away with as the democratic dictator, which as
one will see, not as much as he originally thought.
One will first notice throughout FDR’s second term, that the
prevalence of the democratic dictator far outshines the “people’s
president,” compromising the balance FDR created in his first term.
FDR first reminded the people of the image they had just affirmed in
the 1936 election, “Our covenant with ourselves did not stop there.
Instinctively we recognized… the need to find through government
the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the individual the
ever-rising problems of a complex civilization.”54 In the preceding
paragraph, FDR described that covenant, and the imagery attached
to the word “covenant,” is of equality and shared vision, ideas en-
compassed by FDR’s “people’s president.” While equality had a big
part, FDR played an even more significant role as he defined the
necessary “instrument of our united purpose” as the government it-
self, and as Stuckey suggested in a previous discussion, FDR merged
the government’s identity with his own. In essence, FDR himself be-
came the instrument.55 In other words, the unification he had dis-
cussed in his first term, that the United States all worked toward one
goal, neither he nor the people more important, had vanished.
FDR mainly discussed poverty, which FDR said the government
could solve by obtaining more power and responsibility, the essen-
tial goal of the democratic dictator: 
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Nearly all of us recognize that as intricacies of human re-
lationships increase, so power to govern them also must
increase… The essential democracy of our Nation and the
safety of our people depend not upon the absence of
power, but upon lodging it with those whom the people
can change or continue at stated intervals…56
FDR clearly stated that the government had to assume more and
necessary power to fix the problems that plagued the nation, mean-
ing the role of the democratic dictator increased with it. Then, not so
subtly, he reminded the people that their will put him in place to as-
sume that power, “the people can change or continue” with the per-
son they gave the power. In terms of the democratic dictator, the
dictatorial side increased in the sense of his assumed leadership.
However, as before, FDR grounded the dictatorial side within democ-
racy, as he left the decision and ultimate burden on the people to
change what they disagree with. At this point in his second term, at
the inauguration, FDR still gave attention to the “people’s president,”
however, one will see that shift in the following discussed chats as
FDR attempted to change the two other branches of government.
FDR did not clearly define what he meant by an increase in
power in his inaugural address, however, he did hint at the next tar-
get of contention, the Supreme Court, as they risked halting the
progress he pushed as democratic dictator. We have already seen
FDR’s contentions with Congress, now he added the Supreme Court
as well. FDR essentially hinted at the fact that he would attempt to
change one of the two remaining branches of government. In refer-
ence to the Court, FDR only said that the people “will insist that
every agency of popular government use effective instruments to
carry out their will.”57 Immediately those listening seemed to under-
stand what FDR referenced, as Samuel Rosenman noted that he
watched the Chief Justice when FDR delivered the line and he had
“no doubt that the Chief Justice understood what the President
meant…”58 Kenneth Davis notes too that many members of the pub-
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lic received the message and a debate about the effectiveness of the
Supreme Court ensued soon afterward.59
FDR’s decision to take on the Supreme Court is the strongest
showing of the democratic dictator, as evidenced in the coming fire-
side chat. More broadly, FDR’s contention came from those that dis-
agreed with his interpretation of the Constitution. Rosenman noted
FDR’s thoughts on his second inaugural ceremonies:
When the Chief Justice read me the oath and came to the
words ‘support the Constitution of the United States’ I felt
like saying: ‘Yes, but it’s the Constitution as I understand
it, flexible enough to meet any new problem of democra-
cy — not the kind of Constitution your Court has raised
up as barrier to progress and democracy.60
Congress worked well with the new seats won in the 1934 and
1936 elections, but the Supreme Court risked the potential progress
that Congress could have. He as democratic dictator held the vision
of the nation, leaving the Supreme Court as nothing more than a dis-
agreeing minority group. The common trait among FDR’s second
term comes with the sentiment that things were the way “he under-
stands it.” In the first couple of years, how he understood the
Supreme Court’s role, in the last couple of years, how he understood
Congress’ role.
FDR began the chat on the Supreme Court by saying the court
had risked and continued to risk the success of the nation so far,
which the people had earned. That risk began when the Supreme
Court nearly struck down the nullification of the gold clause,
“Today’s recovery proves how right that policy was. But when, al-
most two years later, it came before the Supreme Court its constitu-
tionality was upheld only by a five-to-four vote.”61 The entire chat
reads as a heavy attack using the narrative of “us vs. them,” the
“them” in this case the Supreme Court. However, here it seemed
most poignant as the Court not only risked progress now, but FDR
asserted that they had risked past progress too. Essentially, FDR ac-
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cused them of nearly halting progress to pull the nation out of the
Great Depression. 
While both the imagery of both the democratic dictator and “peo-
ple’s president” played a role in this chat, the dictatorial aspect re-
ceived more attention from FDR. He described the branches of
government as a team of three horses, the people holding the leads
directing the team.62 FDR said that two of those, Congress and the Ex-
ecutive, pulled in the same direction, while the third, the Supreme
Court, went their separate way. That they went against the will of
the people. This imagery suggests democracy inherently as a team
working together, but it appeared that the people could not direct the
third horse back on course. FDR suggested in his inaugural that the
best instrument to fulfill the nation’s needs would be himself, “It is
my purpose to restore that balance. You who know me will accept
my solemn assurance that in a world in which democracy is under
attack, I seek to make American democracy succeed.”63 He present-
ed an interesting and obvious dichotomy between democracy and
dictator. The ultimate goal he voiced was to be the “people’s presi-
dent,” a defender and upholder of democracy, yet the means to get
there came from FDR himself. In other words, FDR wanted the peo-
ple to leave that instrument to one man, to FDR. Also, FDR remind-
ed the people of what they had just accepted and elected when he
said: “you who know me.” FDR relied on his past efforts of establish-
ing his image to make this attack on the Supreme Court and his in-
creased emphasis on his dictatorial qualities justified, instead of
balancing his image itself within his speech.
The people decidedly rejected the new direction FDR took with
his image when he emphasized the democratic dictator far more
than the “people’s president.” He received mixed letters, ranging
from, “They can call you a Dictator if they want to, but if you are a
DICTATOR then power to you,” to a letter with a poem entitled
“Franklinstein 1937” detailing how the people created a monster and
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would let it run rampant.64 Those come from letters provided by the
Levines, but it is difficult to get an accurate measure of public re-
sponse. Davis asserts that “a flood of approving letters and telegrams
poured” into the White House after this fireside chat.65 However,
even if that is the case, one cannot verify it without analyzing the
thousands of letters sent in. Davis concedes the fact that public opin-
ion remained relatively unchanged. He cites Gallup polls that noted
a rise from just 41 percent to 45 percent in favor of FDR’s plan. FDR
might as well have considered that no effect at all. He may have re-
ceived many letters showing support, but the polls and the then fail-
ure of his plan are evidence of the lack of support.66
FDR’s failure against the Supreme Court shook his confidence to
the point that he disregarded any discussion of “us” and focused sole-
ly on “me.” Rosenman noted, when discussing the Court-packing
plan, that FDR “felt very confident — almost ‘cocky’ — that he would
win, and was in no mood for compromise.”67 FDR no longer had con-
fidence at that level, leading him to make all issues personal, chang-
ing the “us vs. them” tactic into “me vs. them.” FDR emphasized “me”
since the 1936 election, as one can see in a conversation FDR had
with Raymond Moley, a speechwriter, in 1936, “There’s one issue in
this campaign… and people must be either for me or against me.”68 It
seems as though FDR placed greater emphasis on the people’s ac-
ceptance of him as the democratic dictator, and he attempted to capi-
talize on that with the Supreme Court. The failure undoubtedly
linked that chat with this next one.
The “me vs. them” mentality amplified in the 1938 Congressional
elections, including the emphasis on the democratic dictator, as FDR
saw Congress’ rejection of his proposal towards the Supreme Court
as a rejection of himself. Rosenman asserts FDR reacted to his failure
with the Supreme Court leading to what is now known as “Purging
the Democratic Party.”69 FDR could not place blame on the Supreme
Court, but on the Congress that failed to pass the opinion FDR had
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put forth. It appeared that of those three horses, he lost control of
two. He believed up until that point that he had control, more or
less, of Congress, as his party had the overwhelming majority in both
the Senate and House. In tandem with that, FDR saw himself as the
head of the Democratic Party, separate from just president and saw
it as his duty to direct their liberal agenda and profess its strengths.70
As that leader of constructing and pushing the will of the Democratic
Party, he saw their refusal to support his plan for the Supreme Court
as a rejection of the Democratic Party’s platform, of which many ran
their election on in 1936.71 In FDR’s eyes, if they rejected the plat-
form, they rejected him as well.
FDR did not discredit the Congress for what it had accomplished,
but criticized it for not doing more, specifically for not doing more to
help him further his influence as democratic dictator. FDR first dis-
cussed the fact that the Congress had done nothing to aid the execu-
tive branch’s attempt to reorganize itself.72 He referenced a bill
introduced the previous year that would have expanded the power
and responsibilities of the executive branch.73 In other words, the
Congress had halted his progress in expanding his power through the
image of the democratic dictator. FDR saw the situation as so dire
and so extreme that he likened his current situation then in 1938 to
that of Lincoln. Reusing the term of “Copperheads,” FDR claimed
that never before, except during Lincoln’s presidency, had there
been such a concerted effort to stop progress.74 Where in Lincoln’s
day the “Copperheads” wanted to stop progress in reuniting the na-
tion, the “Copperheads” in 1938 wanted to stop FDR’s progress at
pushing his liberal ideas. They attacked FDR personally in an at-
tempt to stop his efforts. His problem with the Supreme Court had
now carried over to the Congress.
FDR consistently used the imagery attached to the “people’s presi-
dent” to justify the imagery and actions attached to the democratic
dictator. FDR functioned as the tool to fix the problem of Congress,
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which differed, positively to him, from his issue with the Supreme
Court because he had at least some control of the process. In the
case of the Democratic Party and Congress, he saw himself as separate
from his presidency as the Party leader, as mentioned earlier. He
would be the agent, on his own volition, to involve himself in the
Congressional elections, “As the head of the Democratic party… 
I feel that I have every right to speak in those few instances where
there may be a clear-cut issue between candidates for a Democratic
nomination...”75 FDR as democratic dictator spoke those lines. While
he did take care to attempt to separate himself as the president tak-
ing this action by referring to himself as the head of the Democratic
Party, FDR could not possibly believe the people would see any dif-
ference. By virtue of his position, he resigned to the fact that every
action he took involved his presidency.
With his actions as democratic dictator established, FDR tempered
those actions with the recognition that ultimately the people would
decide and he would not do anything to jeopardize that. While his ac-
tions would have an effect, FDR said he knew “that neither in the
summer primaries nor in the November elections will the American
voters fail to spot the candidates whose ideas have given out.”76 It is
an interesting confession, as FDR recognized that no matter what he
did, short of violating the Constitution or changing it, he had no say
in the ultimate decision. Again, as with the Supreme Court, FDR bet
his image against what he wanted, believing it to be both strong and
worth enough for the people to be both attached to it and accept
what he said. FDR, as Dunn says, was “eager to exploit the precious
capital of his prestige and the popular New Deal.”77 That capital had
already taken a huge hit with the Supreme Court, and he had to use
what he had left if he wanted to protect his ability to get what he
wanted. Up until that point, the Congress almost served as an exten-
sion of his presidency, and without it, FDR would not be able to
progress at the rate he would have liked. 
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The public reacted similarly here as they did to FDR’s attempt
with the Supreme Court, rejecting the fact that he had tipped the bal-
ance between the democratic dictator and “people’s president” in
favor of the democratic dictator. Many letters voiced their surprise at
FDR’s attempted reach. The Levines provided a dozen or so letters,
and only a few actually spoke to agreement with FDR. Of those that
disagreed, they shared sentiment similar to this, “Don’t let us down
by using such a tactic so characteristic of the fascist-minded as Red-
baiting.”78 The letters accused FDR of using cheap political tactics to
gain votes in his favor. This seems to be another case, as with the
Supreme Court, of FDR overestimating his political capital and what
he could do with it. While the letters responded in that way, the
Levines note that many elections that FDR involved himself and,
 especially those he involved himself most in, failed to go in FDR’s
favor.79 The people chose to reelect those that FDR had deemed unfit
for his Democratic Party.
FDR continued from his first term into the second with the narra-
tive of both the democratic dictator and the “people’s president,” but
failed to use them to the best of his ability. He overestimated the
 political capital gained by the narrative he created in his first term,
which he believed the 1936 election confirmed, and attempted to ex-
pand the image of the democratic dictator while not compensating
for its counterweight, the imagery of the “people’s president.” One
might then assume that FDR would like to turn away from that
image of the democratic dictator, or at least alter it in a way to be
more favorable. While he did not take that action in his second term,
FDR changed drastically in his third. It is difficult to determine
whether the major failures in his second term had a great effect on
that change; however, change still happened and in a major way.
In his third term, FDR changed the way he justified his actions as
the “people’s president” away from solely the United States to in-
clude the whole world. In his first and second terms, FDR focused
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much of his attention on domestic issues, but he instead focused on
international issues in his third term. One should note that this does
not mean FDR abandoned domestic issues, as one will see in the
fireside chat discussed later about coal miners striking. That change
defined his third term. Before, in his first and second terms, FDR jus-
tified all his actions, end goals, and actions as necessary for the
preservation of the United States. In his third term, however, FDR
changed that end goal to the preservation of democracy. While FDR
admitted democracy’s preservation to be important for the United
States as well, the United States only found itself as an implication in
the far larger goal of preserving democracy in the entire world.
While taking the entire world under his wing, FDR attempted to re-
turn balance back to his image and relationship with the people as
both the democratic dictator and “people’s president” that he had es-
tablished previously in his first term.
FDR began restoring the balance jeopardized in his second term
in his third inaugural, which contained no significant trace of the
democratic dictator. He reduced his image so far, the speech con-
tained only one instance where FDR spoke about himself by using
first person language. The speech surrounded that one lone instance
of “I” with FDR’s use of “we.” The use of “I” came where FDR said
that he hoped the last few fruitful years, the years after the Great
 Depression, had removed people’s great attachment to materialism.80
That formed an integral part to democracy for FDR as for someone
to wholly accept democracy, they had to reject greed and material-
ism otherwise they could not totally engross themselves in a com-
mon cause, which democracy needed. FDR said so in this inaugural,
“We know [democracy] cannot die — because it is built on… an enter-
prise undertaken and carried through by the expression of a free
 majority.”81 Democracy needed a concerted and collective effort by
all, including everyone, even himself. As mentioned earlier, FDR
used “we” instead of “I” throughout his entire address. He either
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spoke of “we know” or “the nation knows.” That language connected
FDR and the people, something essential to the “people’s president.”
That rounds out the essential theme of the inaugural: democracy
thrived, however, external forces now threatened it, and the Ameri-
can people, out of a collective desire, had to come to democracy’s
 defense for the sake of men and freedom everywhere.82
World War II began September of 1939, and with it the rise of fas-
cism, communism, and others, which may help explain FDR’s near
total rejection of the democratic dictator when he gave his inaugural
a little over a year later.83 FDR did not then begin to spout the impor-
tance of democracy in his third term, but one has seen that before, as
FDR always appealed to the function of democracy as the final deci-
sion of what should happen, regardless of his personal belief. In
every speech, he clearly stated the importance of democracy and his
faith in the American people to use it correctly. The situation dif-
fered in his third term as now FDR had an identifiable group to point
out as threatening democracy. In his first two terms, internal ex-
ploitations threatened democracy’s integrity, where now in his third
an outside group stated they wanted to remove democracy in any
form and replace it with their decidedly undemocratic systems.84 In
the first two terms, democracy itself still functioned, albeit poorly, in
his third, those outside forces wanted to destroy it entirely. There-
fore, even if in his inaugural FDR intended to turn away from the
image of the democratic dictator for the time being, the events of
World War II heightened his response, likely leading to the greater
focus FDR gave to discussing democracy.
FDR returned to a more balanced image, like in his first term,
 beginning with a chat given after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which
discussed the threats to democracy, allowing FDR to present himself
as the agent to quell the threat for the people, and the world’s, sake.
He first turned back to using the “us vs. them” tactic. It came in a dif-
ferent form than one previously saw, “Powerful and resourceful
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gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human
race.”85 The “us” included the “whole human race,” whereas before it
only referred to the American people. The “gangsters” attacked
democracy, an inherent trait to human nature; therefore, the attack
included the entire globe.86 The “them” changed drastically as well.
The purpose remained similar, to single out a group to lay blame on,
but FDR’s approach to how he did it changed. He gave the outside at-
tackers a far more deleterious image than he had given others in pre-
vious chats, referring to them as not just immoral or greedy but as
“gangsters.” The group’s composition had changed drastically from
previous chats as well. In his other chats, FDR targeted small sects of
society, but now he contended with whole countries like Germany
and Japan. One could argue those countries represented only a
small sect of the world, but one cannot deny that the scale of FDR’s
targeting had far larger implications than any time before. Always
though, as one will see, FDR placed the American people at the
heart of his efforts. However, FDR undoubtedly included the entire
free world in his discussion. In a way, FDR laid far more responsibili-
ty at the feet of the people than ever before, as before a single nation
was at stake — now the freedom of the world.87
Within that framework of a clear, “us vs. them,” FDR returned to
the images of himself, and the relationship he had with the people
that he established in his first term, meaning that he returned to the
balanced image between democratic dictator and “people’s presi-
dent.” FDR had no doubt the government had to dictate the people to
the best course of action in this time and reminded each individual
of their duty to follow that direction, as to do so would be to protect
democracy. With that said, FDR did not completely separate himself
from the people as he specifically said in many occasions something
similar to this, “the whole future of this nation — depend[s] upon the
manner in which each and every one of us fulfills his obligation to
our country.”88 All people of the United States shared that effort; each
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assigned a set of roles to follow to ensure the future of the nation.
While FDR names specifically the “nation,” meaning the United
States, he undoubted included the entire world, as he had made clear
earlier the situation put all nations at risk. 
FDR always made it clear that the government, including himself,
and the people had separate functions, but never rejected the image
of the “people’s president,” as he created a dialogue of trust between
the two parties working toward the same goal. Remembering what
Stuckey says about FDR merging the identity of the government
within himself, one can see the interaction between the two parts of
FDR’s self-created image. FDR described a relationship of trust be-
tween the two parties, the people and the government, where the
people held the ultimate power, “The government will put its trust in
the… American people,” and if the people disagree with the govern-
ment they “have every right to say so,” but FDR did not think “any
American has any doubt of our ability to administer proper punish-
ment…”89 Again, FDR claimed himself, as the government, to be the
tool the people chose to mete out justice. And as seen many times
before, FDR reminded the people that they had the ability to rescind
that choice, but ultimately, FDR had every confidence they would
allow him to continue down his path. In essence, that example pro-
vides the perfect balance between democratic dictator and “people’s
president.” FDR clearly had control of the direction the nation would
go in, but at the same time, the people could show their disagree-
ment and remove FDR — if they truly wanted to. The “people’s pres-
ident” shines through when FDR conveyed his belief that the people
have their trust in him anyway. In other words, he trusted them to
trust him.
The people welcomed FDR’s attempt to rebalance his image, as
many wrote accepting messages to the White House using similar
language that FDR had used in his speech.90 Of the twelve letters pro-
vided by the Levines, only one had something inherently negative to
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say about FDR’s speech, which expressed outrage about the fact that
FDR gave no information to the particulars about the attack on Pearl
Harbor.91All of the other letters expressed positive reactions, many
returning similar language that FDR used, “Your great speech last
night prompts me to write to you and say how much I trust you…”
and “I want you to know that your wish is our command.”92 Another
letter even detailed how when she listened to the speech, it sounded
as if her father spoke to her and not the president, which points to
what Stuckey discusses about how FDR gave himself a paternal role
as leader of the government.93 The people trusted FDR as the peo-
ple’s president and gave him the authority of the democratic dictator.
FDR effectively persuaded them as he reestablished his image and
easily transitioned the people from domestic to international issues,
both of which had key roles in the protection of democracy.
FDR furthered that balanced image when he addressed the nation
in another fireside chat in May of 1943 about striking coal miners.
This chat offers unique insight into FDR’s third term as it addressed
a particular domestic group, the only fireside chat to do so of the fif-
teen he gave in his third term. Other chats discussed domestic is-
sues, but they served as a way to inform the people of the war
situation at home and abroad. This chat related directly to the war ef-
fort, but in a different way, as it discussed the risk of progress to the
war. FDR showed his commitment to this new goal established in his
third term of protecting democracy, as he would not even let a do-
mestic threat go by. In doing so FDR offered a far more telling sign of
his commitment to protecting democracy, as when targeting a do-
mestic issue, as one saw in his second term, he risked the balance he
had struck with the people. In the previous chat, and the inaugural
before it, one could see that FDR put the people on a level playing
field so they could collectively work toward his proposed end goal.
Singling out a group could risk that balance, if FDR let the democrat-
ic dictator imagery tip the scales again. The chat differed from others
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in another way as well, because the issue did not matter. The chat
served only to further FDR’s rebalanced image, as before he gave the
chat, the miners indicated they would go back to work, but FDR de-
cided to go through with the speech anyway.94 That gave FDR an
enormous advantage, as he already knew the outcome to be decided,
where the people might only assume that FDR’s speech had con-
vinced the mines to go back to work. 
FDR also returned to the tact of using the traits of the “people’s
president to justify his actions as democratic dictator. FDR opened
the chat by praising the American people for all the progress so far in
the war effort. Following that, FDR condemned the miners, compar-
ing their strike to that of the international threats, “This tremendous
forward movement of the United States and the United Nations can-
not be stopped by our enemies. And equally, it must not be ham-
pered by any one individual or by the leaders of any one group here
back home.”95 The miners had the potential to harm the war effort as
much as the international groups. In other words, they threatened a
crucial part of democracy, the collectivity of the nation. Then, in an
interesting move, FDR used the traits of the democratic dictator to
restore further balance with the “people’s president.” FDR said that
the government had done all it could do to fix the problem, through
things like wage fixing, but even they could only give the problem
limited attention due to the war effort. 96 FDR interfered with the
miners the most when he ordered the government to take over the
mines, but the government could go no farther, meaning the people
had to sort out the situation. 97 FDR turned the “us vs. them” strategy
on its head. Before, he used it to gain the people’s support in his solu-
tion, now he used it to give his support to the people. He put his trust
in the American people to do the right thing by heeding “the clear
call to duty…” and marching “shoulder to shoulder with our armed
forces to victory.” 98 FDR continued the mutual relationship with the
people, implicating they served equal importance to those serving in
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the military. In other words, he had confidence he would receive
their trust back.
The letters the Levines provide offer no indication of whether the
people received FDR’s new balanced image in this chat or not. How-
ever, Buhite and Levy offer some kind of indication to the outcome
in their brief introduction to the fireside chat. They portray the issue
of the striking miners as a quarrel between FDR and a man named
John L. Lewis, who led the United Mine Workers at the time. Buhite
and Levy contest that the chat led to Lewis’ ultimate loss to Roo-
sevelt over the strike issue, as soon after FDR gave his chat, polls in-
dicated “Lewis was one of the most hated men in America.”99 The
chat’s ultimate goal served to boost FDR’s popularity essentially, as
the issue was resolved before he gave the chat. Being able to defeat a
major labor leader, it appears as though FDR garnered a reasonable
amount of support.
FDR’s balanced image in his third term serves as evidence to the
fact that he learned from the mistakes he committed in his second
term. World War II also played a significant role in how FDR ap-
proached his image as well. This made FDR’s third term closely re-
semble his first, by creating the concurrence of his two seemingly
separate images. They only differed in the separate means they
served to fulfill to allow FDR to achieve whichever goal he wanted at
the time. As in his first term, FDR returned to the tactic of using the
democratic dictator as the agent through which the government
would act, but then used the traits of the “people’s president” to justi-
fy those actions. FDR had an easier time pointing to the “people’s
president” in his third term though, as he had created an end goal of
democracy. At its very core, the idea of the “people’s president”
served to protect the idea of democracy; FDR turned to that reason
for why what he proposed should happen. Coupled with the fact that
in every speech FDR turned to the public and said he trusted them to
choose the right path, to decide democratically the correct course of
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action, he had created a powerful counterweight for the actions he
proposed as democratic dictator.
The journey explained here through FDR’s image in his first three
terms as president help to explain how FDR changed what it meant
to be president and how he left a lasting legacy that still affects the
United States today. In his first two terms, FDR had clear end goals
in mind on specific policy issues, but in his third he concerned him-
self only with democracy, unaware of what the policies looked like.
This forced FDR to have to adhere to the image he created far more
than before, as his persuasion came almost entirely from the image
he created. Specific policies grounded the first two terms with which
he could use to persuade the public. In other words, FDR ultimately
had something to fall back on besides just his image to persuade the
public. His third term differed in that FDR did not necessarily have a
particular issue to fall back on, as World War II defined the entire
term as the sole issue, meaning that the people consistently looked
specifically to FDR as an authoritative figure to lead the defense of
democracy. Everything he discussed had to do with the war effort in
some way. One can define FDR’s first term as the rise of the bal-
anced image of the democratic dictator and “people’s president,” his
second as a rejection of that balance in favor of the democratic dicta-
tor, and third as the return and rebound to accepting the balanced
image, where one sees it more completely than any other time he
served as president. That journey and ultimate end result of bal-
anced imagery proposed by FDR serve as a significant part in his
lasting legacy, as many attribute the way we understand the presi-
dency today to FDR’s actions as president.
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